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Abstract
U.S. welfare and tax policies targeting single mothers were transformed over a decade ago.
What was the impact on single mothers’ happiness? Using data from the General Social Survey,
difference in difference estimators are calculated. The results appear to indicate that the package of
welfare and tax policy changes increased happiness. The results are largely consistent across three
comparison groups and robust to various specification checks. This research nicely complements
the literature by examining the impact of the welfare and tax policy changes on a novel outcome
measure, self-reported happiness.
KEYWORDS: single mothers, happiness, welfare reform, difference-in-difference, subjective
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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. welfare and tax policies that target single mothers have been profoundly
altered over the last two decades. The changes have been fundamental and
presumably life altering for poor single mothers. A substantial empirical
literature has developed to investigate the resulting changes in welfare use,
employment, earnings, consumption, family structure, health, and child welfare
(for example, Bitler and Hoynes, 2007; Blank, 2002; Grogger and Karoly, 2005;
Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Meyer and Sullivan, 2008; and Moffitt, 2003).
One important outcome, however, has not been studied—the impact on
subjective well-being (SWB). Prior to the changes, single mothers consistently
reported below average happiness. Moreover, there are reasons to believe the
changes may have affected single mothers’ SWB.
For example, basic
microeconomic theory predicts that work requirements and time limits, key
components of welfare reform, should reduce the utility of those on welfare since
(i) hours worked generally enters one’s utility function negatively and (ii) time
limits reduce one’s choice set. Thus, without an offsetting increase in
consumption, the changes may have reduced the utility of an already unhappy
group.
Meyer and Sullivan (2008) study the material well-being of single
mothers before and after welfare reform. They find that total consumption
increased between 1993 and 2003 for single mothers in the bottom consumption
quintiles with housing and transportation spending accounting for most of the
increase. Meyer and Sullivan also find that the consumption of leisure fell
sharply for single mothers in the bottom half of the consumption distribution.
They estimate that for each hour of lost leisure time, non-leisure-time
consumption increased by an average of three dollars. Meyer and Sullivan posit
that welfare reform reduced well-being if the value of lost leisure time is greater
than three dollars per hour.
Importantly, Meyer and Sullivan are limited to estimating the reform’s
impact on an economic indicator—consumption—and extrapolating a conditional
argument regarding its impact on overall well-being. Further, recent research has
shown that material well-being may not be a good measure of overall well-being.
Diener and Seligman (2008) report that, “there are distressingly large, measurable
slippages between economic indicators and well-being.” Thus, the impact of the
welfare and tax policy changes on SWB cannot necessarily be discerned from the
extant literature.
An alternative measure of well-being increasingly used by economists is
self-reported happiness (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). In this paper, the use of
such measures is extended to the evaluation of welfare and tax policy changes.
Specifically, the impact of the changes on self-reported happiness is estimated
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using a difference-in-difference estimator and data from the General Social
Survey. The results appear to indicate that the changes increased—and certainly
did not decrease—happiness. The paper unfolds as follows: the next section
provides a brief overview of the relevant literature; the third section discusses the
empirical implementation; and the fourth and fifth sections present and discuss
the results.

II. BACKGROUND
The first federally funded welfare program—initially known as the Aid to
Dependent Children program and subsequently renamed the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program—was established as part of the Social
Security Act of 1935. The initial objective was to support single mothers so that
they did not have to work outside the home (Grogger and Karoly, 2005). In the
ensuing decades, as the labor force participation rate of mothers dramatically
increased, the initial objective became obsolete. This change in conjunction with
ballooning caseloads led to the establishment of the welfare reform movement in
the 1960s. A primary goal was to move recipients from welfare to work.
In 1962, the federal government was given authority to waive AFDC
policies so states could implement pilot projects intended to make welfare
programs more effective (Grogger and Karoly, 2005). Pilot projects had to be
cost neutral and rigorously evaluated. At first, few states implemented “waiver”
reforms. However, starting in 1987, the number of waiver reforms began to
increase. For example, 30 waiver reforms were approved between 1987 and
1992, and 83 were approved between 1992 and 1996. In the latter period, 43
states plus the District of Columbia received approval for one or more reforms; 29
of these reforms were statewide (no statewide reforms were approved in the prior
period). The reforms included a wide range of AFDC program changes, for
example, financial work incentives, work requirements, sanctions for noncompliance with program requirements, time limits, and transitional Medicaid and
childcare benefits.
This period of policy experimentation culminated in 1996 with the passage
of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA). PRWORA eliminated the AFDC program and replaced it with the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) program. In contrast to AFDC,
TANF included work requirements, a five-year lifetime time limit, and incentives
to reduce illegitimate births and single-parent households (Blank, 2002).
PRWORA also increased the availability of work supports, increasing childcare
subsidies and transitional Medicaid benefits.1
1 For a more detailed discussion of welfare reform see Grogger and Karoly (2005).
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2727
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During the same period, additional important changes were made to
programs that target poor single mothers: the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),
Medicaid, job training, and subsidized childcare. For example, the EITC was
increased repeatedly between 1984 and 1996 with the largest increases occurring
between 1993 and 1996. Specifically, the phase-in rate, phase-in range, and
phase-out range were increased in 1985, 1987, and in each year between 1991 and
1996 (Holz and Schulz, 2003). During this period the maximum credit that a
single mother with two children could receive increased from $500 in 1984 to
$3,556 in 1996. In total, EITC credits grew fifteen-fold during this period, from
$1.6 billion in 1984 to $25.1 billion in 1996 (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000).
Medicaid eligibility was expanded during this period as well. It was
delinked from AFDC eligibility and progressively extended to low-income
pregnant women and children (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000). For example,
states were permitted to cover children ages two and under in families with
income below the federal poverty line starting in 1987; and states were required to
cover all children ages five and under in families with income below 133% of the
federal poverty line starting in 1990. Additionally, some states extended coverage
further using their own funds. In 1997, the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) was created, providing medical coverage for pregnant women
and children in families with income too high to qualify for Medicaid, but too low
to purchase private medical insurance (Center for Medicare and Medicaid, 2011).
By 2008, there were over 7 million children covered by CHIP (SCHIP was
renamed CHIP, the Children’s Health Insurance Program). Finally, expenditures
on job training and childcare grew dramatically during this period, from a little
over $100 million (combined) in 1984 to over $650 million in 1996 (Meyer and
Rosenbaum, 2000).2
In summary, the welfare and tax policy changes described above were
largely designed to increase the labor force participation of single mothers. A
vast literature developed to identify the resulting changes in welfare use,
employment, earnings, consumption, health, family structure, and child welfare
(for example, Blank, 2002; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Grogger and Karoly, 2005;
Moffitt, 2003; and Meyer and Sullivan, 2000). The findings appear to indicate
that, at least in the short run, the changes had the intended effect, reducing welfare
use and increasing employment. Further, single mothers’ consumption and health
do not appear to have been compromised in the process (Meyer and Sullivan,
2008; and Kaestner and Tarlov, 2006). While some questions remain, including
what role the robust economy played (Blank, 2002), it appears that the changes
were successful, at least from the government’s perspective.
2 For a detailed discussion of the changes between 1984 and 1996 see Meyer and Rosenbaum
(2000).
Published by De Gruyter, 2011

Brought to you by | Santa Clara University
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/2/15 7:25 PM

3

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 60

In contrast, the situation may appear quite different to single mothers. For
example, there are several reasons to believe the changes reduced single mothers’
SWB. As discussed previously, the imposition of work requirements and time
limits should reduce a recipient’s utility. Further, having to work when one is a
single mother presumably creates additional life stressors that may reduce wellbeing—arranging childcare and managing a household solo while working.
Conversely, there are reasons to believe the changes may have increased single
mothers’ SWB. For example, it has been shown that individuals take pleasure
from working even in mundane jobs (Diener and Seligman, 2008). Further, there
is a stigma (cost) associated with being on welfare (Moffitt, 1983). This cost is
presumably mitigated or eliminated if one exits welfare. Finally, time limits may
act as a commitment device that help individuals with self-control problems exit
welfare (for a discussion of commitment devices see DellaVigna, 2009).
In summary, one cannot exclude a priori either of the following: (i) that
the changes decreased SWB, or (ii) that they increased it. Thus, one is left with
an empirical question, about which the literature has been interestingly silent. For
example, of the cited reviews, only Grogger and Karoly (2005) vaguely suggests
such an investigation: the last sentence of chapter seven states, “further research
on broader measures of well-being would usefully complement efforts that have
focused on traditional, if limited, measures of income.”
A growing body of research, however, suggests that it would be valuable
and feasible to conduct such an investigation. Four reasons that it is worthwhile
follow. First, economists are concerned about well-being. Second, as was
discussed previously, well-being cannot necessarily be measured using economic
indicators alone. Third, SWB is positively correlated with other beneficial
outcomes, for example, happy individuals are healthier and more productive at
work than are unhappy individuals (Diener and Seligman, 2008). Fourth, this
study enables one to consider a potential ethical concern: was welfare “fixed” at
the expense of a subpopulation—single mothers—that already reported below
average happiness.
Further, this investigation appears feasible. A growing number of
economists have been using happiness data in their research (Kahneman and
Kreuger, 2006). Such data has been shown to provide information about a
respondent’s well-being (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005). For example, many
objective measures of well-being are positively correlated with self-reported
happiness. Individuals who report being happier are rated to be happier by others
(spouses, family members, friends, and associates); absent from work less; more
optimistic about the future; more energetic, flexible, and creative; and less likely
to need psychological counseling (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Moreover, Krueger
and Schkade (2008) report that the reliability of SWB data is high enough to
warrant its use in across-group comparisons.
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Two recent papers have started to explore the effect of welfare and tax
policy changes on SWB. Gregg et al (2009) examine the impact of a series of
welfare and tax policy changes in the United Kingdom (U.K.) that were intended
to help low-income families with children. The changes included tax credits for
low-income working families, active welfare case management, welfare-to-work
programs, and increased welfare benefits. In contrast to the changes in the U.S.,
the changes in the U.K. did not include punitive sanctions for failing to comply
with the welfare-to-work program requirements. The outcomes examined include
those that one would typically find in such research, for example, employment, as
well as SWB. The authors find that the changes significantly increased selfreported life satisfaction and mental health. In a working paper, Herbst (2010)
examines the effect of welfare reform on SWB. To do so, the author uses acrossstate variation in the timing of waiver reforms and PRWORA implementation and
an alternative dataset, the DDB Needham Life Style Survey (the GSS—and its
self-reported happiness measure—are the most commonly used data for studying
SWB in the U.S.). The Life Style Survey does not include a self-reported
happiness question but does include a self-reported life satisfaction question as
well as measures of physical and mental health. Herbst finds that PRWORA
appears to have increased SWB and that the waiver reforms had a more mixed
impact on SWB.
The current paper adds to the literature by studying the impact of welfare
and tax policy changes on SWB in the U.S. This nicely complements the existing
literature, which examines various other outcome measures, including more
conventional measures of well-being, such as, consumption and health.

III. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
A. THE DATA
Single mothers’ happiness is examined using the General Social Survey (GSS), a
standard data source for studying self-reported happiness in the U.S. The GSS was
administered annually to approximately 1,500 individuals between 1972 and 1993
(with the exception of 1979, 1981, and 1992) and was administered biennially to
approximately 4,500 individuals thereafter. The GSS is designed to include a
representative sample of U.S. households. The sample is created using multistage area probability sampling except at the block level where quota sampling is
used with quotas for sex, age, and employment status (GSS, 1972-2010:
Cumulative Codebook, 2011).3 The National Opinion Research Center, which

3 The first stage selects primary sampling units (standard metropolitan statistical areas or nonmetropolitan counties) and is stratified by region, age, and race; the second stage selects block
Published by De Gruyter, 2011
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administers the GSS, states that, “In general, the GSS samples closely resemble
distributions reported in the Census and other authoritative sources.”
In addition to the detailed demographic and labor market questions
included in the GSS, there is a standard question about global happiness.
Specifically, it asks respondents “Taken all together, how would you say things
are these days–would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too
happy?” Since the current study is primarily focused on single mothers’
happiness after welfare reform, the analysis is limited to the period immediately
preceding and succeeding PRWORA’s implementation; PRWORA was
implemented nationwide during a 17-month period—from September 1996 to
January 1998 (Grogger and Karoly, 2005). Given that the GSS is administered in
February, March, and April, the before-reform period includes data from the
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1996 GSS and the after-reform period
includes data from the 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 GSS.4
Importantly, the happiness question has remained intact during this period.
However, there have been two changes to the survey and sampling that might
impact self-reported happiness trends during this period: (i) surveys were
conducted in Spanish that could not have been completed if English was the only
language in which the survey was offered in 2006; and (ii) non-responsive subsampling was introduced in 2004. To create a consistent measure of self-reported
happiness: (i) the surveys that were conducted in Spanish that could not have been
completed in English are dropped; and (ii) phase weights are used with the 2004
and 2006 GSS.
After those over the age of 45 are dropped, there are 15,713 respondents.5
Their average happiness is 2.19 where “not too happy” (10.9 percent of
responses), “pretty happy” (59.2 percent of responses), and “very happy” (29.9
percent of responses) are coded as one, two, and three, respectively [see Column
(1) of Table I]. Respondents are likely to be high school graduates, white, in good
or excellent health, and employed.

groups or enumeration districts and is stratified by race and income; the third stage selects blocks
with probabilities proportional to size; and finally, interviewers proceed along a prescribed route
conducting face-to-face interviews until their quota is fulfilled (interviews are conducted after 3
p.m. on weekdays and during the weekend in an attempt to limit not-at-home bias). For additional
details regarding the GSS sample see Appendix A of the GSS, 1972-2010: Cumulative Codebook
(2011).
4 As is discussed in the robustness section, the main results are robust to excluding the 1996 and
or 1998 GSS.
5 Respondents over the age of 45 are dropped since they are less likely to be affected by welfare
and tax policy changes targeting poor single mothers.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2727
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Table I
Demographic characteristics
All
(1)

Single
Mothers
(2)

All except
Single Mothers
(3)

Single
Childless Women
(4)

Single
Childless Men
(5)

Married
Mothers
(6)

Variable
Subjective well-being
+

Average happiness

2.190 (0.005)

1.963 (0.015)

2.221 (0.006) ***

2.155 (0.015) ***

2.095 (0.013) ***

2.337 (0.012) ***

Very happy

0.299 (0.004)

0.166 (0.009)

0.317 (0.004) ***

0.259 (0.011) ***

0.220 (0.009) ***

0.397 (0.010) ***

Pretty happy

0.592 (0.004)

0.631 (0.012)

0.587 (0.005) ***

0.637 (0.012)

0.655 (0.011)

0.542 (0.010) ***

Not too happy

0.109 (0.003)

0.203 (0.010)

0.096 (0.003) ***

0.104 (0.008) ***

0.125 (0.007) ***

0.061 (0.005) ***

Less than high school

0.113 (0.003)

0.187 (0.187)

0.102 (0.003) ***

0.059 (0.006) ***

0.086 (0.006) ***

0.080 (0.005) ***

High school

0.553 (0.004)

0.614 (0.011)

0.546 (0.004) ***

0.495 (0.012) ***

0.544 (0.010) ***

0.575 (0.009) ***

Some college

0.083 (0.002)

0.094 (0.007)

0.082 (0.002) *

0.077 (0.006) *

0.085 (0.006)

0.089 (0.005)

College

0.182 (0.003)

0.081 (0.006)

0.196 (0.003) ***

0.287 (0.011) ***

0.215 (0.009) ***

0.195 (0.008) ***

More than college

0.066 (0.002)

0.022 (0.003)

0.072 (0.002) ***

0.079 (0.006) ***

0.069 (0.005) ***

0.061 (0.005) ***

Black

0.151 (0.003)

0.350 (0.011)

0.123 (0.003) ***

0.131 (0.008) ***

0.098 (0.006) ***

0.094 (0.006) ***

White

0.768 (0.003)

0.566 (0.011)

0.797 (0.004) ***

0.791 (0.010) ***

0.821 (0.008) ***

0.829 (0.007) ***

Other race

0.082 (0.00)

0.083 (0.006)

0.080 (0.002)

0.078 (0.007)

0.081 (0.006)

0.077 (0.005)

Poor

0.014 (0.001)

0.022 (0.003)

0.013 (0.001) ***

0.016 (0.003)

0.008 (0.002) ***

0.011 (0.002) ***

Fair

0.096 (0.002)

0.144 (0.008)

0.090 (0.002) ***

0.087 (0.007) ***

0.092 (0.006) ***

0.082 (0.005) ***

Good

0.358 (0.004)

0.376 (0.011)

0.356 (0.004) *

0.348 (0.012) *

0.372 (0.010)

0.348 (0.009) *

Excellent

0.261 (0.004)

0.188 (0.009)

0.270 (0.004) ***

0.284 (0.011) ***

0.277 (0.009) ***

0.272 (0.009) ***

Employed

0.763 (0.003)

0.656 (0.011)

0.777 (0.004) ***

0.781 (0.010) ***

0.788 (0.009) ***

0.639 (0.009)

Unemployed

0.036 (0.002)

0.043 (0.005)

0.035 (0.002)

0.038 (0.005)

0.054 (0.005)

0.011 (0.002) ***

Age

32.80 (0.060)

32.98 (0.159)

32.75 (0.065)

29.10 (0.179) ***

29.35 (0.152) ***

34.68 (0.116) ***

Number of children residing in household

1.005 (0.010)

1.914 (0.024)

0.878 (0.010) ***

0.000 (0.000) ***

0.000 (0.000) ***

Education

Race

Health

Employment status

Other

Family income (in 1986 dollars)

$29,536 (237)

$14,342 (343)

$31,605 (262)

***

$21,127 (572)

***

$25,015 (578)

***

2.048 (0.019) ***
$38,880 (607)

***

Female

0.549 (0.004)

1.000 (0.000)

0.486 (0.004) ***

1.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000) ***

1.000 (0.000)

Single

0.527 (0.004)

1.000 (0.000)

0.464 (0.004) ***

1.000 (0.000)

1.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000) ***

++
1,775
13,588
2,352
15,713
1,942
Observations
*, **, and *** signify that the mean is significantly different than the mean for single mothers with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

2,829

+

where 1 = "not too happy," 2 = "pretty happy," and 3 = "very happy."
happiness data is missing for approximately 15% of respondents, health status is missing for approximately 25% of respondents, and parental status is missing for
approximately 1% of respondents.

++

B. THE UNHAPPINESS OF SINGLE MOTHERS
Single mothers are an unhappy group. Their average happiness is 1.96, which is
0.26 happiness points less than the average for “non-single-mothers” (all
respondents except single mothers). This happiness gap is the result of being less
likely to report high levels of happiness and more likely to report low levels of
happiness. In particular, single mothers are 15 percentage points less likely to
report being “very happy” and 11 percentage points more likely to report being
“not too happy” than are non-single-mothers [compare Columns (2) and (3) of
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Table I]. A difference of means test reveals that each of these differences is
statistically significant. Moreover, the happiness gap is quite large. For example,
the gap is equivalent to the decrease in average happiness that would be generated
by a ten plus percentage point increase in the unemployment rate (Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2009).
The happiness gap is perhaps not surprising given single mothers’
demographic characteristics. That is, single mothers are significantly more likely
to have characteristics associated with low levels of happiness (for a discussion of
characteristics that are associated with low levels of happiness see Frey and
Stutzer, 2002). For example, single mothers are significantly more likely to be
nonwhite, single, and in poor or fair health than are non-single-mothers; their
average family income is also half that of non-single-mothers. To test whether
one can eliminate the happiness gap by controlling for single mothers’
demographic characteristics, an equation of the following form is estimated:

Happinessi    SM i    X i   i

(1)

where SMi is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i is a single mother
and zero otherwise, and Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics for
individual i including gender, age, race, native born, marital status, education,
self-reported health, income, and region.6 Equation (1) is estimated using an
ordered probit.7
Estimating equation (1) without covariates, the coefficient on SM is
negative, large, and highly statistically significant [see Column (1) of Table II].
This indicates that single mothers are significantly less happy than non-singlemothers. Adding controls for demographic characteristics that are exogenous
(gender, age, race, and native born) as well as for region and year do not affect the
results [see Columns (2) and (3) of Table II].

6 To be identified as a single mother in this study, a respondent has to (i) be female and single
(widowed, divorced, separated, or never married), (ii) have children, and (iii) report that at least
one child ages 17 or under lives in the household.
7 Some researchers who study SWB trends cluster the observations by year when calculating
standard errors, for example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2009). The results are robust to doing so.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2727
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Table II
Coefficients from estimating equation (1)
Ordered
probit
(2)
-0.5046 (0.0331) ***

Ordered
probit
(3)
-0.5046 (0.0332) ***

0.1555 (0.0216) ***

0.1567 (0.0216) ***

< 28 years old

-0.1129 (0.0251) ***

-0.1186 (0.0252) ***

> 36 years old

-0.0792 (0.0239) ***

-0.0810 (0.0240) ***

-0.0831 (0.0248) ***

Black

-0.2964 (0.0304) ***

-0.3100 (0.0310) ***

-0.2032 (0.0328) ***

Other

-0.1485 (0.0424) ***

-0.1425 (0.0430) ***

-0.0698 (0.0443)

-0.0116 (0.0398)

-0.0091 (0.0401)

-0.0539 (0.0413)

Ordered
probit
(1)
-0.4838 (0.0301) ***

Variables
Single mother
Female

Ordered
probit
(4)
-0.0558 (0.0390)
0.0761 (0.0223) ***

Age (reference group is between 28 and 36 years old)
0.0453 (0.0283)

Race (reference group is white)

Not native born
Marital status (reference group is married)
Widowed

-0.4865 (0.1140) ***

Divorced

-0.4905 (0.0350) ***

Separated

-0.6982 (0.0591) ***

Never married

-0.4499 (0.0276) ***

Education (reference group is some college)
Less than high school

-0.1821 (0.0357) ***

High school

-0.0915 (0.0263) ***

College

0.0582 (0.0322) *

More than college

0.0332 (0.0368)

Health (reference group is good health)
Poor health

-0.5408 (0.1043) ***

Fair health

-0.3972 (0.0370) ***

Excellent health

0.4107 (0.0268) ***

Log real income

0.0876 (0.0131) ***

Region and year dummies
Observations

No

No

Yes

Yes

13,296

13,296

13,296

13,296

standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

The results materially change, however, when one adds controls for
demographic characteristics that are not exogenous (marital status, education,
Now, the coefficient on SM is
self-reported health, and income).8
indistinguishable from zero [see Column (4) of Table II]. Thus, it appears that the
unhappiness of single mothers can be explained by life circumstances. The
coefficients on income, marital status, and health indicate that low-income, being
single, and being in poor or fair health are each associated with low levels of
happiness. Care must be taken, however, when interpreting this result, since
education, health, income, and marital status are not exogenous. Thus, one should

8 This distinction between exogenous and endogenous demographic characteristics follows the
approach used by Stevenson and Wolfers (2009).
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not claim that these life circumstances cause single mothers to be unhappy or vice
versa.
C. THE IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATOR
Given that the welfare and tax policy changes target single mothers, this research
focuses on their SWB. Specifically, the “first difference” is the change in
happiness of single mothers before and after PRWORA. Identifying those likely
to be affected by welfare and tax policy changes based on demographic
characteristics is an approach that was pioneered two decades ago by Ellwood and
Bane (1985) and has been used repeatedly since (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005).
This approach is required since survey respondents were not asked about their
participation in programs that target single mothers. Further, it has two distinct
advantages over directly identifying beneficiaries of such programs. First, it
eliminates any concerns one might have regarding endogeneity between
happiness and participation in such programs. Second, it captures both the
“entry” and “exit” effects of the welfare and tax policy changes. For example, the
same single mother might have chosen to receive welfare prior to PRWORA but
not after, perhaps, due to the work requirement. The impact of the changes on
such “non-entrants” will be captured in the first difference. If beneficiaries were
identified directly, however, the impact on non-entrants would not be captured.9
Causation cannot be demonstrated using the first difference alone, since
there are numerous alternate explanations for any observed difference. To isolate
the impact of the welfare and tax policy changes, comparison groups must be
used. For a comparison group to effectively control for underlying trends in
SWB, members must share some characteristics with single mothers, but must not
be affected by the welfare and tax policy changes. Three comparison groups are
used: single childless women, single childless men, and married mothers. While
none of the comparison groups is perfect, each appears to satisfy—at least
partially—the criterion and has been used previously (Bitler and Hoynes, 2007).10

9 For a discussion of entry and exit effects see Moffitt (1996).
10 In addition to controlling for underlying trends in SWB, the comparison groups should also
help control for local economic conditions (the analysis does not directly control for them), since
men and women’s labor market outcomes are roughly equally sensitive to local economic
conditions and business cycles (Hoynes, 1999). Further, less-educated individuals across all
groups are more sensitive than are more-educated individuals; and both less-educated men and
women are highly sensitive to local economic conditions and business cycles. Thus, single
childless men should be a valid comparison group. In contrast, highly-educated single mothers are
not a valid comparison group (even though they have been used previously), as highly-educated
women are significantly less sensitive to local economic conditions and business cycles than are
less-educated women.
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Specifically, the “second difference” is the change in happiness of
members of the comparison group before and after the reforms; thus, the
Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimator is:
SingleMoth ers
SingleMoth ers
( Happiness Aftert
 Happiness Before
)
Group
Comparison Group
( Happiness Comparison
 Happiness Before
)
After

(2)

For the DD estimator to be unbiased two identifying assumptions are necessary.
First, there are no underlying trends in happiness that differ between single
mothers and members of the comparison groups. Second, there are no additional
contemporaneous shocks, other than the welfare and tax policy changes, to the
happiness of single mothers or members of the comparison groups during the
period of study. It should be noted that DD estimators cannot identify individual
policy effects when more than one policy is changed contemporaneously. Thus,
the DD estimator will capture the combined impact of the package of welfare and
tax policy changes.11 The validity of the two identifying assumptions is discussed
in the results section.
Two-by-two DD estimators are commonly estimated using a regression of
the following form:

Happiness i   After Afteri   SM SM i 

 After  SM ( Afteri * SM i )    X i   i

(3)

where Afteri is an after-reform dummy variable that equals one if individual i
completed the survey in the after-reform period and zero otherwise; and SMi and
Xi are defined as before. The coefficient  After  SM is the DD estimator. Donald
and Lang (2007), however, show that the standard errors from estimating such an
equation can be negatively biased due to common group effects. Furthermore,
they show that this is the case even if a researcher uses one of three standard
techniques to control for common group effects, for example, clustering the
observations when calculating the standard errors.

11 This is a known weakness of two-by-two DD estimators. To isolate the effect of welfare
reform from the effect of the other welfare and tax policy changes discussed in the background
section of the paper, a researcher could use cross-state variance in welfare-reform implementation
dates (for example, Bitler et al, 2005). The GSS, however, does not contain enough observations
to conduct such an analysis. There are only 935 single mothers in the 1990s in the GSS; that is
less than two observations per year per state.
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Following Donald and Lang (2007), the DD estimators in this paper are
computed using a two-step procedure, which Donald and Lang illustrate results in
an efficient estimator. In the first step, an equation of the following form is
estimated:
Happinessi   88  SM i  Yi ,88   89  SM i  Yi ,89     06  SM i  Yi , 06 

 89  Yi ,89   90  Yi ,90     06  Yi ,06 

(4)

  Xi  i
where Yi,t is a year dummy variable that equals one if individual i completed the
survey in year t and zero otherwise; Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics
for individual i including gender, age, race, native born, marital status, education,
and region; and SMi is defined as before.12 The coefficient  t is the happiness
gap estimator for year t, that is, the difference in happiness between single
mothers and members of the comparison group in year t. The 1988 year-effect is
dropped to avoid perfect collinearity and is captured in the constant.
In the second step, the happiness gap estimators are regressed on a
constant and an after-reform dummy variable. That is, an equation of the
following form is estimated:

 t   0  1  Aftert

(5)

where Aftert is an after-reform dummy variable that equals one if the year t is in
the after-reform period and zero otherwise, and  t are the happiness gap
estimators from step one; there are 12 happiness gap estimators (  t ), one per
GSS wave used. The coefficient 1 is the DD estimator. Equations (4) and (5) are
estimated using ordered probit and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), respectively.

IV. RESULTS
A. FIRST STEP: HAPPINESS GAP ESTIMATORS
Estimating equation (4) with the first comparison group—single childless
women—one finds that all the happiness gap estimators are negative, confirming

12 Income is not used as a covariate because it is likely affected by the welfare and tax policy
changes. Self-reported health is not used as a covariate because it is a measure of subjective wellbeing.
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that single mothers are less happy, on average, than single childless women in
each year. As illustrated in Figure I, this holds regardless of which covariates are
used in the analysis. Moreover, Figure I appears to illustrate that the happiness
gap estimators are less negative, on average, after 1997 than before. If this were
the case, it would indicate that single mothers are happier after the reforms
relative to single childless women. The second step of the two-step procedure
will test whether this is the case.
Figure I
The happiness gap estimators from estimating equation (4) with single childless
women as the comparison group
0.25
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All covariates
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Figure II is analogous to Figure I except that the second comparison group
is used—single childless men. Again, it appears that the happiness gap estimators
are smaller after 1997. Finally, Figure III illustrates the happiness gap estimators
when the third comparison group is used—married mothers. Here, the pattern of
happiness gap estimators is less clear. In particular, the happiness gap estimators
between 1988 and 1994 vary dramatically from year to year. However, between
1998 and 2004—the years immediately succeeding the reforms—there is a clear
pattern of increasing happiness among single mothers relative to married mothers.
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Figure II
The happiness gap estimators from estimating equation (4) with single childless
men as the comparison group
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Figure III
The happiness gap estimators from estimating equation (4) with married mothers
as the comparison group
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Finally, examining other coefficients from estimating equation (4), the
results are unsurprising. Table III presents the results of estimating equation (4)
with single childless women as the comparison group. The results indicate that
being black, non-native, and less educated are each associated with being less
happy.
Table III
Other coefficients from estimating equation (4) with single childless women as
the comparison group

Variables
Age (reference group is between 28 and 36 years old)

Ordered
probit
(1)

Ordered
probit
(2)
0.0888 (0.0522) *

< 28 years old

0.0504 (0.0500)

> 36 years old

-0.0630 (0.0527)

-0.0865 (0.0542)

Black

-0.1632 (0.0526) ***

-0.1344 (0.0569) **

Other

-0.1057 (0.0833)

-0.0877 (0.0848)

-0.1975 (0.0904) **

-0.1817 (0.0924) **

Race (reference group is white)

Not native born
Marital status (reference group is widowed)
Divorced

0.0035 (0.1576)

Separated

-0.1477 (0.1670)

Never married

-0.0442 (0.1586)

Education (reference group is less than high school)
High school

0.1275 (0.0714) *

Some college

0.1837 (0.0705) ***

College

0.3191 (0.0839) ***

More than college

0.3190 (0.0894) ***

Region and year dummies
Observations

No

No

3,182

3,182

standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value <
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

B. SECOND STEP: DD ESTIMATORS
Estimating equation (5) with the first comparison group—single childless
women—one finds that the DD estimators are positive and highly statistically
significant. The positive sign indicates that single mothers’ happiness increased
after the reforms relative to single childless women. This results hold regardless
of which covariates are used in the analysis [see Columns (1) to (3) of Panel A in
Table IV]. To assess the magnitude of the observed effect, equation (4) is re-
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estimated using OLS. Now the happiness gap estimators can be roughly
interpreted as being measured in happiness points.13 Re-estimating equation (5)
with these happiness gap estimators, the DD estimator ranges from 0.079 to 0.088
depending on which covariates are used. This indicates that single mothers’
happiness increased by roughly 0.08 happiness points after the reforms relative to
single childless women. This increase is almost half the size of the happiness gap
between single mothers and single childless women, 0.19, over the study period.
Table IV
DD estimators from estimating equation (5) with single childless women children
as the comparison group
Ordered
probit
(happy)
(1)

Ordered
probit
(happy)
(2)

Ordered
probit
(happy)
(3)

Probit
(very happy)
(4)

Probit
(very happy)
(5)

Probit
Probit
Probit
Probit
(very happy) (not too happy) (not too happy) (not too happy)
(6)
(9)
(8)
(7)

Panel A: unrestricted sample
DD estimator

First-stage observations

0.1675 ***

0.1713 ***

0.1544 ***

0.2255 **

0.2301 **

0.2223 *

-0.1182

-0.1131

(0.047)

(0.049)

(0.046)

(0.098)

(0.101)

(0.101)

(0.082)

(0.079)

-0.0832
(0.073)

{0.086} ***

{0.088} ***

{0.079} ***

{0.047} **

{0.050} **

{0.050} *

-{0.038}

-{0.035}

-{0.023}

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

-0.8594

Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
DD estimator

First-stage observations

0.2275

0.2363

0.2286

0.2316

0.2436

0.2427

-0.7117

-0.7983

(0.137)

(0.149)

(0.152)

(0.178)

(0.189)

(0.186)

(0.689)

(0.794)

(0.900)

{0.121}

{0.124}

{0.120}

{0.040}

{0.042}

{0.041}

-{0.161}

-{0.165}

-{0.158}

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

-2.7077

Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
DD estimator

First-stage observations

0.2475

0.2391

0.2297

-1.3643

-1.3784

-1.4057

-1.9066

-2.7130

(0.409)

(0.423)

(0.444)

(1.454)

(1.465)

(2.385)

(1.253)

(1.882)

(1.890)

{0.134}

{0.127}

{0.116}

-{0.307}

-{0.301}

-{0.294}

-{0.337}

-{0.351}

-{0.336}

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

Control variables
Age, gender, native-born,
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
and race
Education, marital status,
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
and region
standard errors in parenthesis; average "happiness points" in brackets in Columns (1) - (3) and average marginal effects in brackets in columns (4) - (9)
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Yes
Yes

The observed increase in single mothers’ happiness could have been
caused by an increase in reports of being “very happy,” a decrease in reports of

13 This interpretation is “rough” since the happiness measure is ordinal.
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being “not too happy,” or both. To investigate, equation (4) is estimated using a
probit regression in which the dependent variable indicates whether a respondent
reports being “very happy” or “not too happy.” Then the resulting “very happy”
or “not too happy” gap estimators are used when estimating equation (5). The
“very happy” DD estimators are positive and statistically significant, indicating
that single mothers became significantly more likely to report being “very happy”
after the reforms relative to single childless women. Again, this result is
consistent regardless of which covariates are used [see Columns (4) to (6) of
Panel A in Table IV]. Calculating the marginal effects for the “very happy” gap
estimators, and then using these when estimating equation (5), it appears that
single mothers became approximately 5 percentage points more likely to report
being “very happy” after the reforms relative to single childless women. This is a
30 percent increase relative to the percent of single mothers who report being
“very happy” over the study period (5 percent / 16.6 percent). Finally, the “not
too happy” DD estimators are negative but not statistically significant, suggesting
that single mothers became less likely to report being “not too happy” after the
reforms relative to single childless women [see Columns (7) to (9) of Panel A in
Table IV]. In summary, it appears that the increase in single mothers’ happiness
is evident at each end of the happiness distribution.
Switching to the second comparison group—single childless men—one
finds further evidence that single mothers’ happiness increased after the reforms.
Specifically, the DD estimators are all positive and statistically significant, the
“not too happy” DD estimators are all negative and statistically significant, and
the “very happy” DD estimators are all positive but generally not statistically
significant [see Columns (1) to (9) of Panel A in Table V]. These results indicate
that single mothers’ happiness increased after welfare reform relative to single
childless men, and that the increase is evident at each end of the happiness
distribution. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect appears similar regardless
of whether one uses single childless women or men as the comparison group.
In an attempt to focus the analysis on those single mothers who are most
likely to be affected by the welfare and tax policy changes, the sample is
restricted, first, to respondents who have at most completed high school (≤ 12
years of education) and, second, to respondents who did not complete high school
(≤ 11 years of education). These restrictions should incrementally increase the
likelihood that single mothers in the sample were affected by the welfare and tax
policy changes, since education is a proxy for earning potential and eligibility for
the programs in question is restricted to those with low-income.14
14 Similar restrictions have been used in the literature (for example, Kaestner and Tarlov, 2006).
Restricting the sample by income is not appropriate as the reforms presumably affected the income
of poor single mothers.
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Estimating equations (4) and (5) with the restricted samples, the DD
estimators generally increase in magnitude as the restriction on education
becomes stronger. This is the pattern one would expect if the welfare and tax
policy changes caused the increase in happiness, since less educated single
mothers are presumably more likely to be affected by the welfare and tax policy
changes. This pattern is clearest and most consistent when single childless men
are used as the comparison group. In this case, all the DD estimators increase
monotonically as the restriction becomes stronger [compare Panels A, B, and C in
Table V]. For example, the DD estimator grows from 0.1945 to 0.3321, and
finally to 0.5039, as the restriction on the sample is strengthened [see Column
(3)]. Measured roughly in happiness points, the DD estimators using the most
restricted sample implies that single mothers’ happiness increased by
approximately 0.28 happiness points after welfare reform relative to single
childless men.
Table V
DD estimators from estimating equation (5) with single childless men children as
the comparison group
Ordered
probit
(happy)
(1)

Ordered
probit
(happy)
(2)

Ordered
probit
(happy)
(3)

Probit
(very happy)
(4)

Probit
(very happy)
(5)

Probit
Probit
Probit
Probit
(very happy) (not too happy) (not too happy) (not too happy)
(9)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Panel A: unrestricted sample
DD estimator

First-stage observations

0.2042 **

0.2102 **

0.1945 **

0.1948 *

0.1934

0.1852

-0.2715 **

-0.2795 **

(0.072)

(0.075)

(0.080)

(0.107)

(0.109)

(0.117)

(0.096)

(0.091)

{0.104} **

{0.075} **

{0.065} *

{0.047} *

{0.086} **

{0.088} **

12

12

12

12

12

12

-{0.081} **

-{0.059} **

-0.2663 **
(0.089)
-{0.073} **

12

12

12

-0.4855 ***

Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
DD estimator

First-stage observations

0.3270 **

0.3334 **

0.3321 **

0.2355

0.2329

0.2385

-0.4817 ***

-0.4926 ***

(0.117)

(0.118)

(0.115)

(0.202)

(0.203)

(0.200)

(0.124)

(0.123)

{0.174} **

{0.205} **

{0.204} **

{0.054}

{0.078}

{0.078}

12

12

12

12

12

12

(0.124)

-{0.157} ***

-{0.148} ***

-{0.154} ***

12

12

12

Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
DD estimator

First-stage observations

0.5198 **

0.5259 **

0.5039 *

0.4261

0.4278

0.3802

-0.5829 *

-0.5827 *

(0.221)

(0.223)

(0.232)

(0.354)

(0.355)

(0.365)

(0.296)

(0.294)

(0.300)

{0.293} **

{0.287} *

{0.279} *

{0.080}

{0.072}

{0.051}

-{0.210} *

-{0.085}

-{0.103}

12

12

12

12

12

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

12

12

12

12

-0.6024 *

Control variables
Age, gender, native-born,
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
and race
Education, marital status,
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
and region
standard errors in parenthesis; "happiness points" in brackets in Columns (1) - (3) and marginal effects in brackets in columns (4) - (9)
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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The pattern is also apparent using single childless women as the
comparison group. The DD estimators increase monotonically as the restriction is
strengthened. However, the DD estimators increase by very little switching from
the first to the second restriction [compare Columns (1) to (3) of Panels B and C
in Table IV]. Interestingly, the “very happy” DD estimators become negative and
large (but not statistically significant) when the second restriction is used; in
contrast, the “not too happy” DD estimators follow the “expected” pattern,
becoming more negative when the second restriction is used [compare Columns
(4) to (9) of Panels B and C in Table IV]. This suggests that single mothers who
did not complete high school became less likely to report being “very happy” and
“not too happy” after the reforms relative to single childless women.
Finally, when using the third comparison group—married mothers—the
“standard” results do not emerge.
Specifically, the DD estimators are
approximately zero when the unrestricted sample is used [see columns (1) to (3)
of Panel A in Table VI]. This is not surprising given the happiness gap estimators
illustrated in Figure III and discussed previously. Specifically, the happiness gap
estimators vary dramatically between 1988 and 1994. In contrast, single mothers’
happiness appears to have increased relative to married mothers between 1998
and 2004, the six years immediately following PRWORA. Further, the DD
estimators grow in size as the restriction on education is strengthened. When the
sample is restricted to respondents who did not complete high school, the DD
estimators are all large and positive but not statistically significant, suggesting
that less-educated single mothers’ happiness increased after welfare reform
relative to less-educated married mothers [see columns (1) to (3) of Panel C in
Table VI].
C. ROBUSTNESS
To further test the robustness of the results, and to examine the validity of the two
identifying assumptions, the following three checks are performed: First, data
collected in close proximity to the implementation of PRWORA is dropped.
Specifically, the data from the 1996 GSS is dropped, then the data from the 1998
GSS is dropped, and finally, data from both the 1996 and 1998 GSS are dropped.
The DD estimators are unaffected; their sign, magnitude, and statistical
significance remain largely unchanged. Appendix Table AI presents the DD
estimators when all covariates are used; the results are largely the same if no
covariates or only the exogenous covariates are used. Thus, the results are not
dependent on the exact definition of the before- and after-reform periods.
Second, the happiness gap estimators are not increasing in the beforereform period. Visual inspection of Figures I to III appears to confirm this. To
formally test whether this is the case, the happiness gap estimators are regressed
on a time trend variable (=year of survey – 1988) for the before-reform period,
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1988 - 1996. All time trend coefficients are indistinguishable from zero and half
have a negative sign. Appendix Table AII presents the time trend coefficients.
Thus, there is no indication that single mothers’ happiness is increasing or
decreasing in the before-reform period relative to each comparison group. Thus,
it appears that the first identifying assumption is likely to hold—that there are no
underlying trends in happiness that differ between single mothers and members of
the comparison groups.
Table VI
DD estimators from estimating equation (5) with single childless women children
as the comparison group
Ordered
probit
(happy)
(1)

Ordered
probit
(happy)
(2)

Ordered
probit
(happy)
(3)

Probit
(very happy)
(4)

Probit
(very happy)
(5)

Probit
Probit
Probit
Probit
(very happy) (not too happy) (not too happy) (not too happy)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Panel A: unrestricted sample
DD estimator

First-stage observations

-0.0071

0.0062

0.0015

0.0689

0.0817

0.0631

0.1318

0.1273

0.1335

(0.082)

(0.086)

(0.092)

(0.113)

(0.117)

(0.120)

(0.136)

(0.137)

(0.144)

-{0.002}

{0.005}

-{0.008}

{0.009}

{0.013}

{0.003}

{0.050}

{0.046}

{0.014}

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
DD estimator

First-stage observations

0.0215

0.0324

0.0357

0.0883

0.1004

0.0901

0.0663

0.0663

0.0568

(0.068)

(0.071)

(0.067)

(0.126)

(0.131)

(0.128)

(0.125)

(0.127)

(0.129)

{0.012}

{0.018}

{0.009}

{0.018}

{0.020}

{0.003}

{0.024}

{0.023}

{0.015}

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

-0.4533

Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
DD estimator

First-stage observations

0.3220

0.2898

0.3092

0.8904

0.8314

0.7874

-0.4004

-0.3991

(0.283)

(0.278)

(0.288)

(0.810)

(0.792)

(0.786)

(0.307)

(0.303)

(0.309)

{0.183}

{0.164}

{0.000}

{0.177}

{0.167}

-{0.008}

-{0.108}

-{0.107}

-{0.049}

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Control variables
Age, gender, native-born,
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
and race
Education, marital status,
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
and region
standard errors in parenthesis; "happiness points" in brackets in Columns (1) - (3) and marginal effects in brackets in columns (4) - (9)
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Lastly, to confirm the validity of the second identifying assumption—that
there are no additional contemporaneous happiness shocks, other than the welfare
and tax policy changes, that differ between single mothers and members of the
comparison groups—the following assertions must hold: (i) that the welfare and
tax policy changes likely caused the observed increase in happiness, and (ii) that
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there are no other plausible explanations for the increase. Three facts help
corroborate the first assertion. First, PWRORA was implemented nationwide
between September 1996 and January 1998. This corresponds to the timing of the
observed increase in happiness. Further, the results are robust to dropping the
1996 and or 1998 GSS, and there is no evidence that single mothers’ happiness
was increasing between 1988 and 1996 relative to each comparison group.
Second, the magnitude of the DD estimator increases when the sample is
restricted to less-educated respondents. This is the pattern one would expect if the
observed increase in happiness is caused by the welfare and tax policy changes,
since less-educated single mothers are more likely to be affected by the changes.
Third, the DD estimators are largely consistent across three mutually exclusive
comparison groups. This implies that single mothers’ happiness must have
increased after the reforms relative to each comparison group. Since members of
each comparison group are less likely to be affected by the welfare and tax policy
changes than are single mothers, the changes are a likely cause for the observed
increase in happiness. Finally, in terms of the second assertion, there were no
additional national policy changes—other than the discussed welfare and tax
policy changes—that targeted poor single mothers during this period.

V. DISCUSSION
The results appear to indicate that the package of welfare and tax policies changes
targeting single mothers, and generally promoting work, increased single
mothers’ happiness. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the changes
reduced happiness. The observed increase in happiness appears to result from
both an increase in single mothers reporting a high level of happiness (“very
happy”) and a decrease in single mothers reporting a low level of happiness (“not
too happy”). The magnitude of the effect appears quite large. The average of the
DD estimators (measured roughly in happiness points) is 0.11 (across all
comparison groups, restrictions on education, and sets of covariates). This is over
a third of the happiness gap between single mothers and all other respondents.
Interestingly, these results appear to indicate that for single mothers the
cost of working in terms of lost leisure time and additional life stressors was more
than offset by the benefits. Recall that Meyer and Sullivan (2008) estimate that
single mothers’ consumption increased by an average of three dollars for each
hour of lost leisure time. Thus, the current results appear to indicate that the value
of an hour of leisure is less than three dollars, or that there must be positive nonpecuniary benefits of working. The latter may at first appear surprising given
conventional economic theory. However, if one believes the findings from
happiness research, it is not surprising. For example, it has been shown that
individuals take pleasure from working even in mundane jobs, that in many cases
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work activities are more enjoyable than leisure activities, and that unemployment
adversely affects well-being (Diener and Seligman, 2008). Apparently, these
finding may also hold for single mothers.
Further, it is important to recognize that some of the welfare and tax
policy changes used incentives rather than penalties to promote work. For
example, the EITC expansion and the introduction of transitional Medicaid
benefits should have increased the benefit, and reduced the cost, of working for
single mothers. Unfortunately, however, the two-by-two DD estimators used in
this paper do not provide any information regarding the effect of individual policy
changes; rather, they estimate the net effect of the package of welfare and tax
policy changes. To better understand which components of the package increased
single mothers’ happiness, it would be useful in the future to identify the effect of
individual policy changes on SWB.
Finally, this research adds to the literature that examines the impact of
social welfare programs by estimating the impact of the welfare and tax policy
changes on self-reported happiness, demonstrating the feasibility of incorporating
such measures into future evaluations of social welfare programs.
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Table AI
DD estimators from estimating equation (5) with the 1996 and or 1998 GSS dropped
Single Childless Women

All years
(ordered
probit)
(1)

Drop
1996 GSS
(ordered
probit)
(2)

Drop
1998 GSS
(ordered
probit)
(3)

Married mothers

Single Childless Men
Drop
1996 & 1998
GSS
(ordered
probit)
(4)

All years
(ordered
probit)
(5)

Drop
1996 GSS
(ordered
probit)
(6)

Drop
1998 GSS
(ordered
probit)
(7)

Drop
1996 & 1998
GSS
(ordered
probit)
(8)

All years
(ordered
probit)
(9)

Drop
1996 GSS
(ordered
probit)
(10)

Drop
1998 GSS
(ordered
probit)
(11)

Drop
1996 & 1998
GSS
(ordered
probit)
(12)

Panel A: unrestricted sample
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DD estimator

0.1544 ***

0.1638 ***

0.1325 **

0.1419 **

0.1945 **

0.1761 *

0.1943 *

0.1759

0.0015

-0.0253

0.0463

0.0196

(0.046)

(0.049)

(0.048)

(0.050)

(0.080)

(0.084)

(0.090)

(0.095)

(0.092)

(0.094)

(0.095)

(0.096)

Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
DD estimator

0.2286

0.2672

0.1785

0.2171

0.3321 **

0.3269 **

0.3034 **

0.2982 *

0.0357

0.0252

0.0780

0.0675

(0.152)

(0.157)

(0.165)

(0.171)

(0.115)

(0.126)

(0.127)

(0.139)

(0.067)

(0.072)

(0.064)

(0.069)

Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
0.2297

0.3274

0.1821

0.2798

0.5039 *

0.5279 *

0.4379

0.4619

0.3092

0.2963

0.3533

0.3404

(0.444)

(0.467)

(0.499)

(0.526)

(0.232)

(0.251)

(0.254)

(0.275)

(0.288)

(0.313)

(0.322)

(0.351)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Education, marital status, and region
standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

DD estimator

Control variables
Age, gender, native-born, and race
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Table AII
Time trend estimates for the before-reform period, 1988 - 1996
Single Childless Women

Ordered
probit
(1)

Ordered
probit
(2)

Single Childless Women

Ordered
probit
(3)

Ordered
probit
(1)

Ordered
probit
(2)

Single Childless Women

Ordered
probit
(3)

Ordered
probit
(1)

Ordered
probit
(2)

Ordered
probit
(3)

Panel A: unrestricted sample

Brought to you by | Santa Clara University
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/2/15 7:25 PM

Time trend

0.0096

0.0091

0.0076

-0.0109

-0.0101

-0.0131

-0.0071

-0.0062

-0.0075

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.013)

-(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.023)

(0.023)

(0.025)

Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
Time trend

0.0189

0.0252

0.0211

0.0083

0.0085

0.0068

-0.0044

-0.0058

-0.0083

(0.042)

(0.046)

(0.047)

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.017)

(0.018)

(0.016)

Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
Time trend

-0.0924

-0.0818

-0.0896

0.0539

0.0573

0.0654

-0.0279

-0.0315

-0.0287

(0.129)

(0.136)

(0.141)

(0.066)

(0.065)

(0.066)

(0.035)

(0.037)

(0.032)

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Control variables
Age, gender, native-born, and race

No
No
Yes
No
No
Education, marital status, and region
standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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